OPTIMAL CONTRACTS IN A MULTI-PURPOSE TASK

Authors

  • I. V. Nykyforchyn Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31471/2304-7399-2020-1(59)-66-71

Keywords:

сontract theory, multitask problem, utility function.

Abstract

In the paper a famous multitask model of principal-agent relations is enhanced with the requirement that a reward is paid only if some minimal threshold in each type of workis attained. We deduce and analyze formulae for the expectedutility of an agent and propose a method to find his optimal behavior depending on the reward function parameters.

References

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Published

2021-01-28

How to Cite

Nykyforchyn, I. V. . (2021). OPTIMAL CONTRACTS IN A MULTI-PURPOSE TASK. PRECARPATHIAN BULLETIN OF THE SHEVCHENKO SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY. Number, (1(59), 66–71. https://doi.org/10.31471/2304-7399-2020-1(59)-66-71